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Abstract
Acetone is a secure operating system kernel that uses a shared address space and
supports Asbestos labels. Acetone uses Asbestos labels to enable a wide variety of
security policies including ones that prevent untrusted applications from being able
to disclose private data. All threads run in the same address space, but have different
memory access privileges. Acetone uses standard memory protection mechanisms
to ensure that all memory accesses are consistent with label rules. The performance
results show that these checks have a relatively low cost.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This master thesis presents Acetone, a new operating system that makes it easier to
implement secure applications. Acetone combines Asbestos labels, a unified address
space, and the ability to easily create new security domains.
Acetone is a redesign of Asbestos, an operating system that introduced Asbestos
labels. Asbestos labels allow security domains to be easily defined in terms of label
primitives. These domains can be defined in terms of both mandatory access control
and discretionary access control policies. Acetone simplifies the Asbestos system call
interface. The benefits from this simplification include making it easier to reason
about security policies, an easier to reason about implementation, and simplifying
sharing of resources between security domains.
1.1 Motivation
Current computer systems do not provide adequate security for their users. Viruses,
spyware, and adware plague many users' systems, and large-scale commercial servers
frequently end up disclosing sensitive information.
These problems mostly stem from two main sources. The first is that software
contains bugs that allow exploits. The second is that in most personal computing en-
vironments, users are willing to run untrusted code that appears to serve a legitimate
purpose.
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Although it is always possible to improve the quality of application code, it is
difficult to remove all security vulnerabilities. Similarly, it is possible to educate
users to make them less trusting, but there are times when it is still desirable to run
untrusted code. Given these difficulties, the best approach to improving security
of applications is to provide better operating system support for isolating modules
from one another, and to allow a user to run untrusted code with a restricted set of
privileges.
The principle of least privilege states that each bit of code that executes on a
machine should run with the least amount of privilege possible [17]. This secures
applications by preventing a bug in one part of an application from being able to
use all of that application's privileges. This principle can also help users by allowing
them to run entire applications with the fewest privileges possible, therefore limiting
the effect that these applications can have on their system.
1.2 Operating System Security Overview
In order to enforce modularity between different components, operating systems
allow code to be run in different domains. A domain is a set of resources that can all
be accessed by the current thread at the same time. Ultimately, in order to implement
the principle of least privilege, it is important that applications can easily create many
domains that each have the smallest amount of privilege necessary. It must also be
simple for these domains to communicate with each other so that each domain can
be small, allowing many domains to exist, each with just the privileges that it needs.
By carefully analyzing how different security domains are created and used, and by
looking at how data can be moved from one domain to another, it is possible to
evaluate an operating system and to determine how easily it enables an application
writer to use the principle of least privilege.
Different operating systems have varying interfaces for creating a domain and
controlling what resources are available in each domain. For instance, most UNIX
systems essentially have one domain for each process running on the system. The
12
memory and register state of different processes are protected from other processes.
Each process domain includes access to the register state of the process, memory
mapped to the process, and access to all of the file and network resources of the user
who owns the process.
1.3 Asbestos Overview
Asbestos allows application writers to reach towards the principle of least privilege
by giving them a set of primitives that provide easy modularization. Asbestos im-
proves upon the UNIX security model in a number of important ways. The primary
improvement is the use of labels for access control instead of basic user IDs and de-
fault process rights. Also, Asbestos allows multiple domains per process, which can
only be entered or accessed in response to receiving messages from other processes.
The basic way to create a new isolated security domain in Asbestos is to create
a new process. Each process has an associated security label that defines a domain
containing all of the resources that the process has access to based on its label and
the label rules. In order to reduce the overhead of having one process in the system
for each security domain, Asbestos also supports having multiple subdomains within
one process. This can be done by assigning labels to ranges of the virtual address
space. These ranges can then only be accessed when the process receives a message
with the appropriate label. For instance, a virtual address space range can be set up
for each user who is logged in to a server, and even if there are bugs in the server, it
is impossible for a user to access another user's data.
Both Asbestos processes and individual pages of memory can have security la-
bels. It is possible for data to move from one security domain to another by sending
a message from one process to another. As messages are transmitted in the system,
Asbestos also keeps track of information flow by updating security labels appropri-
ately.
A simplified SSHD implementation in Asbestos is shown in Figure 1-1. In most
cases, different parts of the functionality are isolated from one another by using dif-
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ferent processes. It is possible for many domains to exist in the SSHD/Protocol pro-
cess because the SSHD/Demux process can send specially marked messages that give
additional privileges but also restrict the SSHD/Protocol process to a sub-domain.
As an example of how an application can be broken up into different domains in
Asbestos, consider a simple implementation of SSHD that permits network logins to
the local machine, but where local users are never allowed to see each other's data.
This application needs to have many privileges on the system, including the privilege
to act on behalf of any user of the system. However, in order to use the principle of
least privilege, most parts of the system should be running with only a few privileges.
For instance, once a user has logged in, SSHD has three main modules that handle
the connection. First, the demultiplexer maps individual network streams to specific
user sessions. Second, the protocol manager handles all ssh-specific protocol tasks,
including encryption. Last, the specific user's shell provides a basic interface to the
users applications and data, and allows the user to perform any task allowed by that
user's privileges.
In this example, in order to follow the principle of least privilege, the application
should be broken up into at least a few different domains. The domain where the
protocol manager executes should only contain the privilege to access the specific
user's network connection and the input and output of the user's shell. The user's
shell should have a domain that has full access to all of the user's privileges. The
demultiplexer needs to have a domain that contains access to the network and all
of the protocol managers. The demultiplexer domain must also run in a domain
that has the privilege to declassify user-private data, allowing it to be sent over the
network.
1.4 Problems
One problem with Asbestos is that it is cumbersome to share data with other do-
mains, as the only way to communicate information between domains is through
messages. This is a problem because it is often easier to write applications that use a
14
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Figure 1-1: Different security domains in Asbestos. Each process has its own address
space and default security domain. In this diagram, every process has the privilege
of sending messages to the processes to the left of it. In addition, the SSHD/Demux
process can declassify user-private data so that it can be sent over the network.
The SSHD/Protocol process has multiple sub-domains that can only be entered in
response to receiving messages from either the SSHD/Demux or the Shell process.
These sub-domains are effectively isolated from each other.
combination of shared memory and message passing than to write applications that
use only message passing. Sharing memory is often a natural way to enable com-
munication between two parts of an application. In cases where a message passing
interface is difficult to implement, shared memory gives application designers an al-
ternative to simply combining two different modules into one, violating the principle
of least privilege.
Another problem with Asbestos is complexity. There are many different abstrac-
tions in Asbestos that use security labels in different ways. Process labels and labels
on pages of memory can both accomplish the same tasks, yet page labels are strictly
stronger as they can control access to all of the memory in a process. It is also pos-
sible for a process to control what information it is willing to accept using either
vm_restore (Section 2.6) or receive labels (Section 2.3.1, yet vm_restore is strictly
stronger. Asbestos is unnecessarily complicated in these respects, and using simpler
abstractions can help.
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Figure 1-2: Security Domains in Acetone. There is only one address space, and
different security domains correspond to regions of memory. Each domain has access
to some data and the use of other gates. The arrows represent a thread using a call
gate. The SSHD/Demux domain can declassify UserA-private data so that it can be
sent over the network.
1.5 Approach
Acetone solves the problems presented above by using a unified address space, mul-
tiple threads of execution, and call gates that can transfer information into different
security domains.
Acetone provides isolation mechanisms that make it easy to create as many do-
mains as desired. It is possible to transfer data to another security domain by using
a gate. These gates provide access to additional resources, but also ensure that these
resources are only used in safe ways. It is also possible for domains to directly share
memory, which can be an easier way to move data from one domain to another.
Domains and gates are both lightweight primitives, allowing a single application to
setup as many security domains as it needs with minimal resource usage.
Figure 1-2 shows how the same SSHD server could be implemented in Acetone.
In Acetone, there is only one address space, and various addresses are in different
domains. Each domain has access to some memory and some gates. It is also possible
for each domain to be labeled with a specific user, meaning that the domain contains
user-private data.
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1.6 Challenges
Acetone presents an interface where every memory operation appears to be checked
by label rules, but the cost of actually performing these checks on every memory
access is prohibitive for modern hardware. A major challenge is to achieve high per-
formance while ensuring that protection domains are never violated. Acetone avoids
some of this cost by using hardware support for memory protection domains. How-
ever, a memory protection domain is a relatively large data structure that is expensive
to create and update. Acetone must support many different protection domains, so it
is important that these operations can be performed quickly. Acetone must support
cheap creation of new domains that do not cause many faulting memory references.
In addition to the performance challenges, the API provided by Acetone must
be simple and secure. It should be easy to define different security domains, and
Acetone must enforce hard modularity between them. This means that a failure
in one domain cannot directly cause failures in another, non-overlapping, security
domain. It should be clear which domains can make accesses to a given domain.
To make the information flow guarantees in Acetone as strong as possible, there
should be no direct communication channels that are not explicitly allowed by the
security policy. This means that the availability of a specific resource cannot be used
to communicate information.
This system should be as simple as possible. This includes making the trusted
computing base small and also having a small number of system calls. Having these
features implemented in an easy to use manner makes it much easier for an applica-
tion writer to design their application using the principle of least privilege.
1.7 Limitations
Acetone is not yet fully implemented, and it has design difficulties that still need to
be investigated. Only the core system calls, memory protection, and basic test ap-
plications have been implemented. Without more applications, and libraries to help
17
support those applications, it is difficult to evaluate all aspects of Acetone's design.
However, Acetone demonstrates that Asbestos labels can be used with an acceptable
performance overhead to provide protection between different components of an
application.
Also, as discussed in Section 6.1, some basic desirable features such as accounting
for and imposing limits on resource usage are not possible in the current design.
1.8 Contributions
This thesis has two main contributions. The first is a simplified operating system
design, Acetone, that addresses weaknesses in Asbestos. The second is a high perfor-
mance implementation of memory protection using Asbestos labels that allows new
protection domains to be quickly created.
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Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Abstractions
Operating system kernels make functionality available to user applications through
various abstractions.
Abstractions in most UNIX operating systems include processes, user identifiers,
file descriptors, path names, and virtual memory operations. By using these ab-
stractions, applications can access various services provided by the kernel or other
applications. Many of these abstractions are actually quite complex. A process is
really the combination of a virtual address space, a current register state, possibly
many kernel threads, a set of open file descriptors, and some security tokens such as
user and group identifiers.
In a traditional microkernel architecture, abstractions generally only include pro-
cesses, interprocess communication (IPC), and memory operations. Other services
must be accessed through IPC.
Asbestos provides abstractions of handles, labels, memory, and processes. As in
microkernel designs, these simple abstractions can be used to provide support for
more complex features such as networking and filesystem access.
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2.1.1 Handles
Asbestos labels serve two main purposes. They serve as communication endpoints.
In addition, they can act as a capability or as a security label for mandatory or
discretionary access control. Asbestos handles are simply 61-bit numbers that refer
to a security label component and a communication endpoint. These numbers are
ephemeral (they are not assigned the same values after reboots), unique (the same
handle will not be reused), and unpredictable.
This code fragment demonstrates an application generating a new handle:
handle_t h;
r = sys new_handle(&h, ...);
The new_handle system call creates a new handle and grants it to the current
process. The kernel associates a security label with this new handle. It is also possible
for the kernel to make this handle be a communication endpoint; this allows the
process to receive messages that are sent to this handle.
At any time, any process can attempt to send a message to a handle. If the handle
is set up as a communication endpoint, then the message is sent, provided that all
checks pass. These access control mechanisms are discussed further in Section 2.2.
There are also system calls that allow some properties of a handle to be changed.
The handle_transfer call can be used to change the communication endpoint of a
handle.
All handles are reference counted by the kernel. When no processes have access
to the handle, all kernel resources associated with the handle are freed. However,
the actual number of the handle is never reused, as it is possible that applications
still refer to that number even though they do not have any privileges with respect
to that handle.
2.1.2 Messages
Messages are the basic packets of information transmitted in Asbestos. All commu-
nication between different processes must be done by sending messages. Messages
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are an in-order sequence of bytes, and have an associated destination handle, type,
code, ID, optional verification label, optional reply handle, and optional payload.
Essentially the type, code, ID, and payload make up the data content of the mes-
sage. The verification label can allow the sender to prove that it has certain security
properties.
In general, a message's code is just used for very small payloads, where only
a simple error code must be reported. The ID field is used to match up requests
and replies. Asbestos defines common message types that are used to standardize
communication between different modules and make virtualization easier.
Message types include:
READ, WRITE Requests data from a handle or sends data to a handle.
LOOKUP Requests a new handle for a related object. For example, for a directory
handle, LOOKUP requests can be used to receive the handles for files within that
directory.
CONTROL Makes a request that does not easily map into the other types.
*_R Replies to a request. Each message type has a reply type as well, used for
responses. For instance, LOOKUP_R messages generally grant a handle to the
process that issued the lookup request.
Messages are stored in a FIFO in the kernel until they are delivered. Each process
has its own FIFO of messages waiting to be delivered. All access control checks on
sending the message are done at send time. However, the receiving process's security
label will not be updated until the message is actually received. Virtual memory
tricks are used whenever possible for message delivery. For small messages, the
actual message data is just copied onto the page that contains the message header.
For larger messages, pages are mapped copy-on-write.
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P, Q Processes *, 0, 1, 2, 3 Label levels, in increasing order
h, dest Handles L, C, D, V, E Labels (functions from handles to levels)
L1 < L 2 Label comparison: true if Vh, L 1(h) < L 2 (h) Ps Process P's send label
max(Li, L2 ) Maximum label: {h k I k= max(Ll(h), L2 (h))} PR Process P's receive label
min(Ll, L2 ) Minimum label: {h k k = min(Li(h), L2 (h))} hR Handle h's receive label
owned(L) Owned-handles label: {h* I L(h) =*} U {h 3 L(h) # *}
Figure 2-1: Asbestos notation.
2.2 Asbestos Labels
All access control and security in Asbestos is implemented using labels. The infor-
mation stored in a label is flexible enough to allow a wide variety of access control
policies to be implemented.
A label is a function that maps handles to levels. Possible levels include *, 0, 1, 2,
and 3. Labels are described as a list of (handle, level) pairs, and a default level which
is assigned to all handles that are not in the list. For instance, the label {hi 0, h2 1, 2}
has a default level of 2. The default level, 2 in this case, appears at the end of the list
and applies to all handles not explicitly listed.
Figure 2-1 shows the basic notation and operations that can be done on labels.
The basic operations include <, max, and min. As shown in the figure, these opera-
tions are run on each of the label components individually to produce the result.
2.3 Label Policies
Labels are used to restrict access to various resources. Processes, pages of memory,
and handles all have rules associated with them that dictate how a given process can
interact with them.
2.3.1 Processes
A process P has two labels associated with it: a send label (Ps) that stores the current
process's capabilities and access restrictions, and a receive label (PR) that restricts
which access restrictions the process is willing to accept.
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Process A is only allowed to send a message to process B if
As < BR.
This check is only used to determine if a message can be delivered. If it can be deliv-
ered, then information flow restrictions are sent along with the message by updating
B s -- max(As, Bs).
Together, the receive restriction and the forwarding of taint information make up a
basic information flow system, as has been shown in many previous designs [5, 13,
15].
These label rules imply that lower levels in the send label are more permissive.
Handles that have low levels associated with them in the send label act as either
capabilities or as low levels of tainting. This means that low levels in the send label
are more permissive. Ultimately, if a process has every handle at 0 or *, it can send a
message to any other process.
In the receive label, lower label components are more restrictive. A label com-
ponent at a low level in the receive label means that the process will not receive
messages from a sender at a higher level. This has the effect of restricting the com-
munication between the processes, and also of limiting what restrictions a process is
willing to accept on its send label.
2.3.2 Effects of Labels
By setting send and receive labels in different ways, it is possible to enable many
different policies. If all label components are either at the default level or the * level,
then labels end up acting like capabilities; they can be freely granted to anything that
the process can communicate with. If the other label levels are used, it is possible for
the labels to enforce a variety of information flow constraints.
By lowering a process's receive label, only processes with explicitly lowered send
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labels can send messages to the given process. If a process's send label is higher
than the default receive level, the process will not be able to send messages to other
processes unless they have explicitly raised their receive labels. As no user can modify
the receive labels of the I/O devices on the system, this effectively stops a process from
releasing any of its data to anything outside of the system.
2.3.3 Effective Labels
A process has some control over how its messages are sent. It is possible for a process
to send a message that is less permissive than the process's current label. These
effective labels allow a process to use a discretionary security policy by choosing
what restrictions and privileges are associated with the message.
When sending a message, a process can provide a verification label V and a
contamination label Cs. Using these, the kernel creates effective send and receive
labels:
Es = max(Ps, Cs), ER = min(QR, V).
These labels are then used instead of the process labels for computing the label check
and the label contamination parts of the send process. This does not violate any
security policies because these labels are all more restrictive than the process labels.
The kernel gives the receiver a copy of V, allowing the sending process to prove that
it has a label at a low level, without granting any privilege.
As an example, consider a trusted multi-user file server. This system has two
handles for each user. One handle, uil, is used for the privilege to access a user's
resources. Another handle, uc, contaminates all user private data. A process acting
on behalf of a user would have a send label of {uI 0} and receive label set to {uc 3}.
The receive label is set to a high level so that the process can receive data that is
private to user u. Once the process has received a message containing user u private
data, its send label is {ui 0, uc3}. This new send label prevents the process from
communicating with non-u processes, as they will have receive labels with {uc 2}.
When the file server receives a message, it checks the verify label, V, only accepting
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the message if V(ui) < 0.
Asbestos provides an additional method of restricting which messages a pro-
cess can receive by allowing additional label constraints to be placed on individual
handles. These are called handle labels and can be set by the process that receives
messages sent to that handle. The handle label restriction and the process label re-
striction are both checked before delivering a message to a handle. When a process
P sends a message to process Q over handle dest, the effective receive label is:
ER = min(QR, destR, V)
2.3.4 Ownership and Decontamination
The * level allows processes to distribute handle access and to declassify information.
A process P that has Ps(h) = * can be considered to own handle h. This process then
has the ability to decontaminate data with respect to h. This decontamination can
be done in two ways. It can be done when the process receives a message. No matter
what the effective send label of the message is, P's send label will stay at Ps(h) = *.
Process P can also modify other process's send labels with respect to h, effectively
declassifying an entire process. This is done by the sender of a message providing
two decontamination labels with each message. One label, Ds, is used to lower a
processes send label and the other, DR, is used to raise its receive label. Both of
these changes add privileges to the process that receives the message, and hence they
require that the sending process have Ps(h) = *. More formally, once the message is
actually delivered, the kernel sets
Qs - max(min(Qs, Ds), Es) and
QR - max(QR, DR),
to actually decontaminate the process Q that receives the message.
Making a process's receive label more permissive can allow the process to become
tainted, which restricts its ability to communicate with other processes. Therefore,
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an additional check is done before changing a process's receive label. The kernel will
not deliver a message unless DR < destR. This check allows a process to control
what changes are made to its receive label.
A process is automatically made the owner of any handle that it creates because
new_handle sets Ps(h) = * when it creates a new handle. In addition, the kernel
sets the new handle's receive label hR(h) = 0 so that only processes that have been
explicitly granted access to the new handle will be able to send messages to it. Every
call to new_handle returns a new handle that has never been used before. This
ensures that the process that creates a handle starts out as the sole owner of that
handle. To change the receive label of a handle, a process can call set_handle_label.
Also, a process can use the setlabel system call to reduce its own rights to a handle
or to allow messages sent to that handle to be delivered to another process.
These ownership, creation, and declassification primitives allows access control
and information flow systems to be built in a completely decentralized manner that
does not require global trust.
2.4 Examples
This section presents a few examples of how Asbestos labels can be used to provide
different access control policies. The fact that this primitive, the Asbestos label, can
implement such a wide variety of policies shows how powerful it is.
2.4.1 Process Isolation
This example focuses on a process P that will create a process Q that is isolated from
the rest of the system. This situation could arise when a web browser wishes to run
a game that is downloaded off of the internet.
One way of achieving this goal is by restricting Q's send label so that it can
only send messages to P. It will still be possible for Q to receive messages from
any process in the system, but all outgoing messages must be sent to P. This is
accomplished by having P create a new handle, j, and increasing Q's send label for
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j to higher than the default receive label. Process P then raises its own receive label
for j so that it can receive messages from Q. Once these steps have been taken, the
processes are set up as follows:
Labels P Q Others
Send j* j3 jl
Receive j3 j3 j2
As a different policy, P may wish to completely isolate Q by only allowing it to
send message to P and only receive messages from P. This restricts as the above pol-
icy does, but it also generates a new handle k that is used to restrict which processes
Q can receive messages from. By setting QR(k) = Qs (k) = 0, Q can only receive
messages from P. The result of these operations is shown:
Labels P Q Others
Send j*,k* j3,kO jl,kl
Receive j3, k 2 j3, kO j2,k2
This setup means that Q can only receive messages from senders that have a send
label level for k at 0 or lower. P is the only process that has that property, so it is the
only process that can send messages to Q.
2.4.2 Multi-level security
A multi-level security (MLS) system is one where each domain is restricted by a no-
tion of current and maximum security level. In Asbestos, these domains just corre-
spond to different processes. A "maximum level" corresponds to security clearance,
and "current level" corresponds to the sensitivity level of information that the cur-
rent process has actually been exposed to. For this description, consider the security
levels of secret and top secret. The rule for message sending is that process P can
send a message to process Q if P's current level is less than or equal to Q's maximum
level. MLS systems also allow for some processes to be part of the TCB1 . These
processes have the ability to change their current security level at will.
1Trusted Computing Base
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Many MLS systems are statically defined by the system that implements them.
Each secrecy level is defined, and every application that uses these secrecy levels
is restricted to using just the predefined set. Asbestos labels make it possible for
applications to define their own system with an arbitrary number of different secrecy
levels. The systems can also be virtualized such that different groups of processes can
be participating in different MLS schemes simultaneously.
This system is implemented in Asbestos by having a trusted process M that is
in charge of the MLS space. This process creates handles corresponding to each
different security level, therefore it possesses s * and t* corresponding to the secret
and top secret levels. Any other trusted services, such as a multi-level filesystem, are
granted access to these handles at the * level as well.
When a process enters the MLS system, its current level is set to unclassified, and
its maximum level is set according to what authentication that process can provide.
Once a process's current security level is changed, it can no longer send messages to
processes that have no access to that security level. If a process S receives some secret
data in a message, that message will also have a contaminate argument that changes
S's send label, restricting what processes it can send messages to. For instance, when
the multi-level filesystem sends a message containing secret data to process S, it also
uses the contaminate argument C, setting Ss(s) = 3, resulting in the following labels:
Labels U S T
Send sl 1 s3 s3
Receive s2 s3 s3
If a second process T, with maximum security level "top secret," then receives a
message from S, T will also end up with send label {s 3}, causing T to only be able
to send messages to processes with maximum security level of secret or top secret. If
top secret information is transmitted to T, then the processes will have the following
labels:
Labels U S T
Send s ,tl s3,tl s3,tl 
Receive s2,t2 s3,t2 s3,t3
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2.4.3 Discussion
These two examples show how powerful the Asbestos labeling mechanism is. The
one label primitive, combined with two different process labels and the concept of
ownership, can be used to implement a wide variety of access control policies in a
decentralized manner.
2.5 Implementation
When labels are visible to user processes, they are simply treated as an array of
handle-level pairs plus a default level. The kernel represents labels as array of point-
ers to internal structures that store information about each handle. Many tricks
are used to minimize memory usage, including sharing, copy-on-write, and using
low-order bits in pointers to store the level.
2.5.1 Processes
Processes in Asbestos are quite similar to processes in other operating systems. A
process has an isolated address space. The bottom 3.75GB of the virtual address
space can be used by user applications. The top 256MB is reserved for the kernel.
There is no shared writable memory. This is important because all interprocess
communication happens through message passing, and label rules can be applied. If
shared memory was allowed, that might enable a new channel of communication.
In addition to the address space, a process has a thread of execution. This is
basically a copy of all of the registers, and allows the kernel to switch between
different processes. A process also has a page fault handler address and a saved
address of an exception stack. These are just used for user-level page fault handling.
As discussed above in section 2.2, a process has a send label and a receive la-
bel, which are used for dictating whether or not the process can send and receive
messages.
Finally, a process can have a saved copy of everything listed above. This allows
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the process to receive a message that is tainted with sensitive information, handle it,
and then restore to the untainted state. The end result is that there are essentially
many different security domains running within one process.
2.6 vmsave/vm restore
So far, labels, and therefore domains, have only been discussed at the process granu-
larity. As demonstrated by the example of the SSHD server, there are times when one
application wishes to have many different security domains. This section presents
functionality that allows a process to have many label spaces defined within it. These
label spaces can only be accessed when the process receives a message with the cor-
rect label for accessing a label space. Checkpoint and restore methods are used to
prevent information flow between different label spaces.
2.6.1 Design
The design goal of these label spaces is to support multiple domains at a lower cost
than one process per domain. The mechanism for this design is motivated by event-
driven architectures that are used in many fast servers [12, 16, 21, 22]. These services
use a simple scheduling loop that looks like:
while (1) {
getnext_event();
processevento();
The advantage of this loop is that no state is implicitly carried from one event to
the next. This is ideal for Asbestos's design, as it should be impossible for one event
to implicitly communicate information to the next event. Note that by default, the
first tainted message that this server receives will taint the entire process, including all
future messages that the server receives. If we modified this loop to instead fork once
per iteration, and have the child handle the event, it would have the label properties
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that we desire. However, it would not be possible for any state to be communicated
from one event to another, even if they were both tainted.
In order to allow state to be maintained from one even to another, some heap
pages can be marked as accessible only to a specific subprocess. These pages are not
accessible to other subprocesses. Any other changes to memory caused by an event
are all done copy-on-write in order to avoid communication of information to other
subprocesses.
Finally, subprocesses are defined in terms of their send label. Each page of mem-
ory is marked with the label of the subprocess that can access it. As subprocesses are
defined by their send labels, it is only possible to gain access to a one is by sending
the process a message with the correct contaminate and declassify arguments.
This functionality is implemented with the vmsave, vm_restore, and pagetaint
system calls. The vm_save system call essentially checkpoints a process, saving its
register state and address space and then waiting for a message. When a message is
delivered, the page-table of the process is manipulated to mark pages copy-on-write
or normal access according to the new send label and the memory page labels. Once
the subprocess is done handling the event, it calls vm_restore, which jumps back to
the process state as of the vm_save call. Finally, a subprocess is allocated by the
untainted process by calling pagetaint, which marks a page with a given label.
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send(dest, Cs, Ds, V, DR, data)
Let Q be dest's controlling process
Let Es = max(Ps, Cs)
Let QnewR = max(QR, DR)
Let ER = min(QnewR, destR, V)
Let Qown = owned(Qs)
Requirements:
(1) Es < ER
(2) DR < destR
(3) If DS(h) < 3, then Ps(h) = *
(4) If DR(h) > *, then Ps(h) = *
Effects:
Grant Ds, contaminate with Es,
then restore owned handles
Qs - max(min(Qs, Ds), Es)
Qs - min(Qs, Qown)
QR - QnewR
new_handle(L)
Let h be an unused handle
Effects:
hR - L
hR(h) 0
Ps(h) -*
Return h
set_handle_label(dest, L)
Requirement:
dest was created by P
Effect:
hR - L
Figure 2-2: Some Asbestos label operations. FP is the calling process.
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Chapter 3
Design
The core of Acetone's design is the system call interface that applications use to
interact with the operating system. In addition, this chapter covers the design of the
virtual memory system in Acetone.
3.1 High Level Overview
Acetone expands on the original Asbestos design by adding support for shared mem-
ory between different applications and simplifying the different security domains
in the system. By reducing the number of abstractions provided, and the number
of ways that they can interact, Acetone is a simpler system than Asbestos yet still
achieves the primary goal of allowing application developers to easily define small
domains.
3.1.1 Abstractions
Acetone's design is built on a few application-visible abstractions.
Security labels allow arbitrary security domains to be easily defined. By setting up
the appropriate labels, applications can be set up to enforce a wide variety of
security policies. Other abstractions in the system all have labels associated
with them in order to restrict access.
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Memory pages store application data. Pages are uniquely identified by the virtual
address that they are mapped at. Each page has a label that controls what
domains can read or write to that page.
Threads run programs. Each thread has a current security label which defines the
security domain that the thread is running in. Each thread can only access
resources that are in its domain.
Call gates allow threads to transfer from one domain to another. A thread can re-
quest access to additional resources by making a request through a call gate.
Each call gate has one label that restricts which threads can access that gate,
and another label that represents the additional privileges gained by using that
gate. A gate automatically sets the program counter of the thread that uses the
gate to the entry point of the gate itself.
In this way, a gate in Acetone acts much like a handle in Asbestos because both
abstractions allow a procedure to access resources in a different domain, but
in a restricted fashion. The access to the different domain is limited because
the program counter is set to the address associated with the gate.
3.1.2 System Calls
Acetone provides system calls for each abstraction.
mem_alloc, memfree, mem_taint - Manage memory. Described in section 3.4
newgate - Creates a new call gate. Described in section 3.5
jumpgate, forkgate - Allows a thread to move into a different security domain.
Described in section 3.3
exit, self_taint - Destroy or change the current thread's label. Described in sec-
tion 3.3.
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3.2 Unified Address Space
Acetone provides only one address space. Because all threads run in a single address
space they can easily share data. A virtual address is sufficient to uniquely identify
a page of memory. It is unnecessary to know which process or address space that
address is associated with. This one global name makes sharing easier because every
entity in the system agrees on the name of a given resource.
A possible disadvantage of using a unified address space is that the kernel can no
longer allow an application to specify an address where it wants to allocate memory.
This is not allowable because allocating memory at a specific address effectively
communicates information to every other domain, as future requests for that address
will fail. Therefore, specifying that memory should be allocated at a specific address
could only be done by a completely untainted application.
Acetone's solution to this problem is that the kernel allocates memory at a ran-
dom address. As long as the virtual address space is large enough, this makes it
difficult to communicate any information through the availability of a given ad-
dress. However, this design means that all applications must support arbitrary load
addresses. This is desirable on any system that uses a unified address space. This
feature can be easily implemented by using PC-relative addressing or by using a dy-
namic binary loader that rewrites parts of the binary to reflect the address that it is
loaded at.
3.3 Threads
Threads are somewhat like Asbestos processes, except more lightweight. All threads
execute in the same unified address space, so it is not necessary to store a virtual
address mapping for each thread. Each thread also has a security label. This label
restricts what resources the thread can access, including memory and call gates, as
described below in section 3.4.1 and section 3.5.
For thread management, the only primitive operations are jumping to call gates,
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terminating the current thread, and a combination of forking the current thread and
jumping to a call gate. By calling jumpgate, the current thread will enter the given
call gate. The details of this are described in section 3.5. The current thread can be
terminated at any time by calling exit. Another call, forkgate, creates a new thread
that is a copy of the current one. This new thread then immediately jumps to the
given call gate.
It is also possible for a thread to reduce its privilege label by calling self_taint.
3.4 Memory Pages
Memory allocation has also been changed from Asbestos because a thread can no
longer specify what address it wants memory to be allocated at. The only primitive
memory allocation operations in Acetone are mem_alloc and mem_free. Allocations
are of any size and the memory will be allocated in a continuous region of virtual
address space. The address of the allocation is returned. Any thread that is allowed
to write to memory is also allowed to free that memory.
In addition to system calls for allocating and freeing memory, Acetone provides a
call that can change a label on a given page. A thread can call mem_taint only if it is
currently able to write to the page, and will also be able to read from the page after
the call is made. More precisely, if the current thread, T, with Town = owned(T1abel)
(refer to Figure 2-1 for a review of label ownership), wishes to change a page's label,
Plabel, to Pb' it must be the case that min(Town, Plabel) < Tabe, and Tabel < Plabel-
3.4.1 Memory Protection
Each page of memory has a label associated with it. This label is similar to the label
on a thread except that it cannot have any components at the * level. The * level
is disallowed because it denotes ownership, and threads are the only primitives that
can own label components. A thread, T, is allowed to read from a page of memory,
P, if Tabel < Plabel. The thread T can write to the page if it can read from the page
and min(Town, Plabel) < Tlabel. The virtual memory system in Acetone provides an
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interface that terminates any thread that makes a memory access that is not allowed
by label rules.
3.5 Gates
In Acetone, the transfer of information from one domain to another is done through
gates. A gate is identified by the address that the program counter is set to when the
gate is called. Each gate has state associated with it that enables the called domain
to safely receive information from the caller domain.
When a gate is called, Acetone grants the current thread new privileges, sets the
thread's program counter to the gate's address, and changes the label on the memory
containing the message so that it can be modified by the current security domain.
To create a new gate, an thread calls newgate and gives it arguments corre-
sponding to each of following properties:
void *address - The address of the gate's handler. This address is also the name of
the gate itself. A thread must have write access to address in order to create
a gate there. This constraint prevents information from being communicated
from the availability of specific gates.
label_t *minAllowed - A thread and a message must have labels that are less re-
strictive than minAllowed in order to call this gate. More explicitly:
max(Tlabel, Mlabel) < HminAllowed
This property functions like the label on a page. A gate, G, is accessible to
every thread, T, where Tiabel < GminAllowed.
labelt *declassify - The label that is used to declassify the incoming thread and
message. This also has the effect of preventing anyone but the receiver from
modifying the message after it has been sent.
boolt newStack - A flag that indicates that a new stack should be allocated when
a thread uses this call gate. This exists solely as a performance optimization.
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boolt singleUse - A flag that indicates that this gate should only be used one
time. When a single-use gate is used, the thread is tainted with minAllowed
because otherwise the availability of this gate could communicate informa-
tion between two disjoint domains. Tainting with minAllowed ensures that all
threads that can call this gate have equivalent security domains, ensuring that
it is acceptable for information to be shared between them.
3.5.1 Using Gates
To send a message from one domain to another, the current thread calls
jumpgatesimple(void gate, void msg, sizet length).
In this case, gate is the gate that will be called, msg is a pointer to the page or pages
of memory that the message is on, and length is the length of the message, and must
be evenly divisible by the page size.
If the current thread (T) calls jumpgatesimple(G, P, 1 page), where G is a
gate and P is a page of memory containing a message, the system call executes the
following steps.
1. Check if the current thread has write access to P. If it does not, then return an
error.
2. Check if the gate is in the current thread's domain (Tlabel < GminSend). If it is
not, then return an error.
3. Tlabel min(Tlabel, Gdeclassify)
4. Plabel min(Pabel7, Gdeclassify)
5
. Tprogram counter +- .
The other registers (including the ones that contain the message and length) are
left alone, allowing some data to be passed through the call gate in the registers
themselves.
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3.5.2 Message Sending
A common use of call gates is for sending messages between domains. In this case,
it is common for a thread in one domain to send a message to another domain,
and for that domain to eventually send a reply message back. The more general
jumpigate system call is set up to help in this common case. This call is much like
jumpgatesimple, except that it optionally creates a reply gate, and calls self_taint
in order to restrict what privileges are usable by the code associated with the gate.
The system call is:
jumpgate(void *gate, void *msg, size_t length, label_t taint, bool_t withReply)
This call performs the following steps.
1. If a reply gate is requested, Acetone creates a single use reply gate that has the
same program counter and stack pointer as the thread that called jumpgate.
2. selftaint(taint)
3. jumpgatesimple(gate, msg, length)
3.6 Hardware Support for Memory Protection
As described above in section 3.4.1, Acetone must ensure that every memory ref-
erence obeys label rules. As actually checking the label rules for a given address is
quite expensive, it is desirable to cache the results of these checks. If these cached
results are stored in a standard x86 page directory, it is possible to use the CPU's
default memory protection mechanisms to check memory accesses against the cache
of currently accessible addresses.
To actually check the label access rules, the kernel must store information about
memory. For each page of virtual memory, the kernel must be able to determine if
that page is mapped, what physical page it maps to, and the label of that page. This
state is stored in two different structures. The first is the ppage array, which has one
entry for each physical page of memory. This structure keeps the label of each page,
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and a list of free physical pages. The second structure is a mapping from virtual page
to physical page. This is saved in an x86 page directory and page tables.
The sections below describe algorithms to implement memory protection using
x86 hardware. On x86, the page table structures keep track of both address trans-
lation and memory protection. For Acetone, the address translation is the same for
every thread; only the address protection must frequently change. Because of this,
these sections refer to the x86 hardware as having a current virtual protection space
rather than virtual address space. This protection space is defined by the permission
bits on the page table entries.
3.6.1 Simple and Slow
A simple algorithm that likely results in bad, but not unreasonable, performance
is one that simply caches the results of label checks and flushes the cache whenever
these cached results might no longer be valid. When an instruction attempts to access
memory that is not currently in these cached results, the processor generates a page
fault exception. The kernel handles this exception by terminating the current thread
or adding a page of memory to the current protection space.
Initially, the entire protection space is set up to have no permissions. When a
page fault occurs, the kernel page fault handler checks the label of the current thread
and the label of the page of memory, and adds permission bits corresponding to that
page if the access is valid. Whenever the currently executing label becomes more
restrictive, all permissions to the virtual protection space are removed, resetting the
system to its initial state.
This algorithm results in many unnecessary page faults. For instance, any time
the processor switches threads, it is likely that the new thread's label will not be
strictly more permissive than the previous thread's label. This implies that after
almost every thread switch, all page tables need to be cleared and there will be a
sequence of page faults. However, this simple design is still a dramatic improvement
over checking every memory operation.
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3.6.2 Reducing Page Faults
The performance flaw with the simple design is that it must recompute the same label
check for the same page if the scheduler switched threads momentarily. It is possible
to improve upon the above algorithm by keeping multiple cached virtual protection
spaces.
The basic idea behind this algorithm is that the kernel keeps a mapping from la-
bels to cached virtual protection spaces. Each virtual protection space is guaranteed
to have no more rights than are specified by the label that maps to it. When a thread
is scheduled to run at a given label, the kernel sets the processor's protection space to
the cached protection space associated with that label. If no cached protection space
is found, then a new one is created.
When a page fault occurs, the label of the faulting address is compared against the
current thread's label. If the access should be allowed, the current virtual protection
space is updated.
Once there are multiple virtual protection spaces, it becomes necessary to keep
track of which spaces allow access to a given page so that when the page is un-
mapped, it can safely be removed from all of the cached protection spaces.
For each page, a list of cached protection spaces containing it is maintained.
When the page is freed, this list is traversed and the page is removed from every
cached protection space. This maintains the invariant that every protection space
only has access to pages that are allowed to be accessed by the label associated with
that address space.
3.6.3 Decreasing Creation Costs
A weakness with this design is that it is expensive to create new domains. Every time
that a new label is used, a completely new protection space must be created. Each
protection space will take up at least a few pages of memory, and the time spent
initializing them can be significant.
The creation cost of new domains can be decreased by allowing a second kind of
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protection space. The new kind of protection space, called a sub-protection space,
is a structure that contains a pointer to another protection space, called the parent
protection space, and a list of additional memory privileges. A sub-protection space's
label is always less than its parent's label.
As in the simple algorithm above, when a page fault occurs, the kernel checks to
see if the current thread has the necessary rights to access that memory. If it does,
then the kernel updates the current protection space to include the new permissions.
Once a sub-protection space's list of changes grows past a certain size, the structure
is replaced by a full protection space.
When the kernel switches to a sub-protection space, it switches to the parent
protection space and then applies the list of additional permissions to it. When
switching away from this protection space, it removes the additional permissions.
When a page fault occurs, the kernel first checks if the label rules allow the kernel to
add the mapping to the parent protection space. If it cannot be added to the parent
space, the kernel checks the label rules for the current protection space.
3.6.4 Finding Parent Protection Spaces
When creating a new protection space, it is desirable to find a suitable parent pro-
tection space. A protection space P can be a parent for a new protection space N if
Nlabel < Plabel. If no suitable space can be found, the empty protection space can be
used, however this will likely result in many page faults. Acetone keeps one cached
protection space for each gate and each currently running thread. When a thread
changes its label or uses a call gate, these cached protection spaces are checked to see
if they can be used as a parent for the new protection space. It is possible that using
a more sophisticated cache could be beneficial; this is discussed in Section 6.1.2.
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Chapter 4
Evaluation
This chapter evaluates the Acetone design both as a stand-alone design and in com-
parison to the original Asbestos design. First, it makes an argument about the sim-
plicity, and therefore security, of Acetone as compared to Asbestos. Second, a covert
channel analysis of Acetone is presented. Finally, actual performance results from
different memory protection schemes are presented.
4.1 Simplicity
Acetone attempts to use the fewest and least complex abstractions possible in order
to allow application developers to easily use the principle of least privilege.
In Asbestos, the procedure to set up, use, and deallocate a subprocess is as fol-
lows:
1. First, the server must be running in a vm_save/vm_restore loop listening for
messages.
2. To start a new connection, the server must receive an untainted message that
informs the server that a tainted connection will be arriving soon.
3. In response to this message, the server allocates a virtual address space range
with pagetaint for the tainted connection. Allocating this range sets up a
subprocess that the server cannot directly access.
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4. The connection is now used by sending messages with the appropriate labels
to the server, and the server can respond to each message and call vmrestore
in order to prepare to receive other messages.
5. Once the connection has finished, another untainted message must be sent to
the server saying that the connection has closed. The timing of this message
is a communication channel between the tainted connection and the untainted
subprocess in the server, so it is generally sent a random amount of time after
the connection closes in order to minimize the amount of information leaked.
6. Once this message has been received, the server frees the virtual address space
range with pagetaint.
This entire procedure places many requirements on the client that interacts with the
server, involving both tainted and untainted messages.
In Acetone, the above situation is simplified because no untainted messages are
required, and it is not necessary to preallocate resources for a new subprocess. This
simplification is possible because memory allocations happen at random addresses
and therefore do not communicate information. In Acetone, steps 2, 3, and 5 are
not required. In addition, step 6 is a bit more natural in Acetone's design because a
special system call is no longer necessary. Freeing of a tainted connection's data can
be done with the standard mem_free.
Another simplification is that in Acetone it is not necessary to have a separate
process send messages with appropriate labels in order to communicate with sub-
processes. As gates can have privileges associated with them, all of these features
can be implemented with gates and threads, so all parts of a server can be imple-
mented in one binary.
Another advantage provided by the Acetone messaging system is that there is no
kernel buffering of messages. The only memory resources managed in the kernel
are execution contexts, gates, security labels, and pages of memory. In Asbestos, the
kernel also has to manage arbitrarily sized messages for an arbitrary amount of time.
This is difficult for accounting because the memory is not technically under control
44
of either process. By removing this case, it should be easier to implement a resource
accounting system, as discussed in Section 6.1.1.
The last argument for Acetone's improved simplicity is that it allows for shared
memory. This does not actually make the operating system kernel any more simple,
but it does allow some application code to be simplified because it is not necessary
to transmit all information in carefully constructed messages. This argument is not
conclusive though, as shared memory can also be bad for security. It is more likely
that malicious code can cause damage to another module if the modules share a
memory region than it is if the modules can only send messages to each other.
4.2 Covert Channels
All communication channels that are not explicitly allowed by label rules are based
on resource starvation. It is theoretically possible for two threads to communicate
by controlling the availability of physical memory, virtual address space, CPU time,
network access, or any other resource that both threads have access to. Many of
these channels could become much less threatening if resource accounting was used,
as discussed in Section 6.1.1.
Asbestos provides direct timing channels because a process can only handle one
message at a time. Essentially, information can be communicated by the precise time
that a process calls vm_restore. In Acetone, this is impossible because a different
thread handles each request concurrently. This could make synchronization for the
server difficult, and in some cases it may be necessary to reintroduce that timing
channel by adding a trusted lock server that must be granted access to each label
component. However, in the common case, where each request is executed in a
thread that runs in an independent security domain, the requests can actually be
executed in parallel, and this timing channel is not necessary.
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4.3 Performance
Acetone is implemented for common x86 hardware. First, this section discusses
some difficulties in using x86 paging mechanisms for applying Acetone's memory
protection. Then performance results from Acetone running on real hardware are
presented and discussed.
4.3.1 Hardware Paging
It is clear that the x86 page protection and translation mechanisms are not ideal for
Acetone. On x86 platforms, both page translation and protection are done with the
same mechanism. Ideally, there would be two separate mechanisms for these two
features. Acetone would fully take advantage of this because it would have just one
address translation structure that could be used by all execution contexts. There
would only be separate address protection structures for each individual execution
context.
In addition, the hierarchical page table mechanism in the x86 architecture is not
ideal for a sparsely filled address space. As allocations tend not be close together in
the virtual address space, each memory allocation often requires a new page table
to be allocated and used. This effect can be mitigated by allocating larger regions of
memory at one time, or by reducing the randomness of memory allocations.
4.3.2 Method of Testing
In order to evaluate the different memory system implementations, a few different
microbenchmarks are run. These microbenchmarks analyze the cost of both creation
of new security domains and the cost of switching between them. The hypothesis is
that by caching protection domains and using sub-protection spaces discussed in
Section 3.6.3, it is possible to have minimal overhead from creating, maintaining,
and enforcing protection domains.
The first microbenchmark just sends a message (a page of memory) back-and-
forth between two non-overlapping security domains. There is only one thread in
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this test, and it simply calls a gate that is in the other domain, and creates a reply
gate to be used to return. An analogous test on a UNIX system is to use pipes to
send a byte of information back-and-forth between two processes.
The second microbenchmark measures the cost of creating a new domain, en-
tering it, and returning from it. This test is analogous to a server running code on
behalf of a user that it has never seen before. It creates a new label component, calls
a gate in a different domain, providing the new label component as a taint argu-
ment. This new domain has the privileges granted by the call gate, but still has the
restriction imposed by this taint argument. The new domain reads authorized data,
writes data to a reply message, and then returns through the reply gate. The UNIX
version of this test calls fork on every iteration and the child receives a request from
and responds to the parent.
The tests were each run in three different configurations. The first was on a
version of Acetone with the very simple memory protection scheme discussed in Sec-
tion 3.6.1. The second run was on Acetone with the optimized memory protection
scheme discussed in Section 3.6.3. The last test was run on a machine running Linux
2.6.9. The tests of Acetone were run on an AMD 1500+ with 64MB RAM. The
Linux tests were run on a Pentium M 1.3GHz with 512MB RAM. None of the tests
are memory constrained, and the two different processors have similar performance
characteristics.
4.3.3 Results
'The results from these tests are shown in Figure 4-1. For the ping-pong test, each
domain accesses the stack, the executable code, and the message. There are never
any page faults caused by the message, because the send procedure ensures that it is
already in the cached protection space. The simple protection mechanism therefore
takes two page faults each time that a gate is used, one for the stack, and one for the
executable code. This gives four page faults per iteration because each iteration uses
an entry call gate and a return call gate. The simple protection implementation is so
slow overall because of the large amount of time spent clearing out protection do-
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Test Protection Mechanism Time Page Faults
ping-pong simple 31.9 s 4
ping-pong optimized 5.5 p/s 0
new-domain simple 30.1 us 3
new-domain optimized 6.3 us 1
ping-pong linux 4 . 0 s 0
new-domain linux 100.0 ts 1
Figure 4-1: Microbenchmark results running with both the simple memory protec-
tion mechanism and the more optimized implementation on an AMD 1500+ proces-
sor with 64MB RAM. Similar tests were also run on a 1.3GHz Pentium-M machine
running Linux 2.6.9. The ping-pong test sent a message to an existing domain and
waited for that domain to reply. The new-domain test is similar, except that each
message is sent to a completely new domain. Each test was run 100 times and the
results were averaged.
mains. The optimized protection implementation takes no page faults in steady state
because it caches protection domains for both reply gates. Its overall performance is
much higher than the simple protection scheme in the ping-pong test because it does
not need to create new protection domain structures and does not take any page
faults. The optimized scheme has very similar performance to Linux.
For the new-domain test, the simple protection scheme takes one fewer page fault
per iteration because a new stack is being mapped for the new domain each time as
part of the send call. The optimized protection scheme takes one page fault per
iteration when accessing the executable code in the new domain. This fault occurs
because this new sub-protection domain's parent is the null domain, and the sub-
protection domain contains only the message and the newly allocated stack. The
performance is still quite high for the optimized implementation because creating
a new domain is easy: it is only necessary to allocate a small structure that stores
the difference between an empty domain and the new domain, rather than storing a
complete page directory. For Linux, the performance on this test is much slower as
calling fork is an expensive operation.
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Chapter 5
Related Work
Acetone is based on the Asbestos [14] operating system. Asbestos labels, applying
labels to pages of memory, and the implementation of capabilities as label compo-
nents are all ideas that Acetone took from Asbestos. In addition, most of the related
work in [11] is relevant to this thesis as well.
Opal [3] is a single address space operating system similar to Acetone. The princi-
ple difference is that Opal defines a domain in terms of a list of capabilities, whereas
Acetone uses Asbestos labels to define domains. Looking into optimizations and
application design used in Opal could be valuable for Acetone's future progress.
Inferno [4] is an operating system that bases protection off of language level
features instead of hardware protection. Like Acetone, all code is executed in a
single address space. Inferno has the limitation that all code must be written in a
specific type safe language. Singularity [7] is a recent operating system that also runs
in a single address space and uses type safe languages to enforce protection.
The work in Paradigm Regained [20] shows that standard access control policies
can be implemented on top of a capabilities based system. Asbestos labels, and
therefore Acetone, implement some of these ideas.
Asbestos is similar to KeyKOS [6] and EROS [19]. The main difference is the use
of Asbestos labels instead of basic capabilities in order to implement security policies.
In addition, KeyKOS and EROS both put considerable effort into being persistent
systems where everything can be checkpointed to disk. Asbestos and Acetone make
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no effort to do this.
Gates in Acetone can be thought of as capabilities. Some believe that a capa-
bility system cannot implement mandatory access control policies [2]. This is not
necessarily true, as long as other policies can be used to control the transmission of
capabilities. Systems such as KeyKOS [10] and EROS [18] achieve mandatory ac-
cess control policies by isolating processes into compartments and ensuring that any
cross-compartment capability obeyed the mandatory access control guidelines.
Many systems have combined capabilities with extra checks on the use of capa-
bilities. Systems have been built that use interposition [8], labels [9], and authority
checks [1]. Acetone combines capabilities with decentralized labels.
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Chapter 6
Future Work and Summary
6.1 Future Work
6.1.1 Accounting
One difficult challenge in operating system design is accounting for resource us-
age. Ideally, it should be possible to implement a resource allocation policy that can
limit resource usage on a per application or per user level. Generally, resources that
should be accountable include I/O resources such as network or disk, memory, and
CPU time. The current Acetone design does not have any support for any sort of
accounting. This is an area for future work.
The original Asbestos design also had little support for accounting. However, it
did have distinct processes, which made it possible to kill certain applications after
they had been started. It seems likely that the same features could be made available
in Acetone if applications were given a certain label when they were started. This
label would need to be shown to the system in order to allocate any resources. It
would then be possible for a privileged program such as kill to find and free all
resources that were allocated using that label. This approach is preliminary though,
and requires a much more complete design.
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6.1.2 Memory Protection Space Selection
The algorithm discussed in Section 3.6.3 does not ideally select cached protection
spaces. In the case of specific tainting labels, for instance a label that taints data as
being private to a specific user, this algorithm will not find a cached protection space,
and will have to default to creating a new, fully restricted one. There are possibilities
to improve both the selection process and the cache usage policies.
6.2 Summary
Acetone provides a simple interface for using Asbestos labels to implement security
protection. Using very few abstractions, labels, threads, memory pages, and call
gates, Acetone provides an interface that allows secure applications to be designed
and implemented. The performance results from microbenchmarks show that Ace-
tone can perform well and is a promising architecture.
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